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by Kevin L. Johnson

Historically, autonomy has been treated as a broad one-dimensional construct.
This paper proposes that there are two major types of autonomy for internal corporate
ventures (ICVs)—planning autonomy and structural autonomy—and examines their
respective impact on performance. Little prior knowledge exists regarding the
autonomy–performance relationship for ICVs despite the billions of dollars of corporate investment in ICVs. In this study, I collect primary data on 38 ICVs at different
stages of development from both venture-level and corporate-level managers from over
a dozen companies in the U.S. Midwest. I find that a negative relationship exists for
planning autonomy regardless of venture stage. However, for venture structural
autonomy, a more complex relationship was discovered, which ranged from positive
to negative to curvilinear based on the venture’s stage of development.

How can an established company
create a successful new business?
Although many factors come to mind and
have become a point of academic debate,
given the parent–venture relationship,
the issue of autonomy should be among
the top candidates. This study provides
an empirical contribution to the corporate entrepreneurship literature regarding the role of autonomy which to date
has been primarily conceptual in nature.

The success of new products is
equated with technical performance,
value to customer, and synergy with firm
competencies (Henard and Szymanski
2001; Zirger and Maidique 1990). Other
than a loose reference regarding management involvement, the examination
of autonomy has been limited. Additionally, prior research suffered from three
important maladies: (1) common method
bias, a long recognized problem that
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causes spurious results due to dependent
and independent variables obtained
together (Campbell and Fiske 1959); (2)
extensive sample contamination from
related phenomena (discussed in detail
later); and (3) ambiguous definitions.
Nevertheless, a popular assumption
driven by anecdotal evidence and implicit theories regarding the success of an
internal corporate venture (ICV) is that
the more autonomy, the better. Consequently, research into the autonomy–
performance relationship has been
inconclusive. The basic research question examined in this study is: Do ICVs
designed with more autonomy perform
better than those designed with less
autonomy?
The major contribution of this study
comes from the identification and development of two types of venture
autonomy—structural and planning—
that are significant to ICV performance.
Whereas venture structural autonomy
(VSA) represents the extent to which the
venture’s operations are linked to those
of other businesses of the corporation,
venture planning autonomy (VPA) represents the extent to which the venture’s
management team is responsible for
establishing goals, timetables, and strategy for the venture. Another major
contribution of this study is the first discovery of the complex relationship
between ICV performance and VSA.
The motivation to examine ICVs is
due to their potential strategic competitiveness for both small and large companies and the lack of understanding of
what truly drives ICV performance, as
shown by the inconsistency of findings
and performance. ICVs are themselves
small businesses. Learning from the
efforts and mistakes of large established
corporations can be crucial to the survival of the independent small business.
Furthermore, the necessary capital available to the large corporation (Baysinger
and Hoskisson 1989; Gooding and
Wagner 1985) to purchase an external
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venture can be a significant constraint for
smaller enterprises. Finally, corporations
invest billions of dollars in resources for
internal venture development projects
even though after years of operations
and irrespective of the measures of
success (Block 1989; Campbell and Park
2004; Garvin 2002, 2004), 50–99 percent
fail to achieve their performance expectations (Birkinshaw 2005; Chesbrough
2000). Yet ICVs continue to be pursued
over external ventures because when
successful, they represent more innovative growth (Antoncic and Prodan 2008;
McCrea and Betts 2008).

Literature Review
and Hypotheses
The Autonomy–Performance Link
Numerous potential contributors to
ICV success and failure have been
explored (MacMillan, Block, and Subbanarasimha 1986; Sykes and Block 1989)
with limited results. Autonomy was first
selected for the study variable here
because it is one of the four dimensions
of ICVs provided by Thornhill and Amit
(2001) that is also arguably a distinguishing factor between corporate and
traditional entrepreneurship (e.g., ICV
managers may be directed by parent corporations, whereas independent entrepreneurs have autonomy over the
decision making for their ventures)—the
other dimensions are degree of relatedness, extent of innovation, and nature
of sponsorship. Autonomy was also
selected because it is also a dimension of
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and
therefore may be a key factor in venture
performance outcomes. A firm with practices and policies designed around entrepreneurship is described as having an
entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin
and Dess 1996). The EO construct
includes dimensions of innovativeness,
proactiveness, risk taking, competitive
aggressiveness, and autonomy (Lyon,
Lumpkin, and Dess 2000; Miller 1983;
Miller and Friesen 1982), and has been
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attributed to the overall success of some
firms (McGrath and MacMillan 2000).
Although there have been mixed results
regarding a specific relationship between
EO and established firm performance
(Wiklund and Shepherd 2005), the most
recent meta-analytical study still indicates a moderate (r = 0.24) relationship
(Rauch et al. 2009), which may be a
result of the role of autonomy.
This study does not test the EO of an
organization but examines the autonomy
relationship. Despite recent papers on
autonomy versus dependence (Robins,
Tallman, and Fladmoe-Lindquist 2002),
autonomy in international joint venture
decisions (Glaister, Husan, and Buckley
2003), and the issue of control versus
autonomy (Paik and Choi 2007), the
importance of autonomy on ICV performance has been generally neglected;
meanwhile, existing scales “were often
limited to measurement of structural
autonomy without regard to strategic
autonomy” (Lumpkin, Cogliser, and
Schneider 2009, p. 53). “[F]rom an EO
perspective [autonomy] refers primarily
to strategic autonomy” (Lumpkin,
Cogliser, and Schneider 2009, p. 50).
In total, virtually by definition, new
ICVs represent innovative and proactive
behavior. A new ICV is also risky as an
unknown (Matthews and Human 2004)
but not always autonomous. An ICV is
linked to an existing parent with whom
the type and level of autonomy may substantially differ; therefore, it is conceivable that autonomy might explain a lot of
variance in ICV performance. However,
in order to ascertain the autonomy relationship for ICVs, we must clearly distinguish the ICV from related phenomena,
thereby addressing an earlier malady.

Related Phenomena—Similar But
Not Sufficient
ICVs exist under the umbrella of corporate entrepreneurship—a broad term
that encompasses several different business development activities (Sharma and

Chrisman 1999). A variety of criteria have
been used since 1977 to depict the ICVs
(see Table 1). In general, a company that
internally generates, funds, and develops
new
businesses
utilizing
internal
resources is directly engaging in internal
corporate venturing or the development
of ICVs (Burgelman 1983, 1984a, 1984b,
1984c; Campbell et al. 2003; Miles and
Covin 2002). In the exploration of internal
ventures, researchers have compared
small versus large firms (Day 1994; Siegel,
Siegel, and Macmillan 1993), independent
ventures versus corporate ventures
(Simon and Shrader 1997; Zahra 1996),
focused on a single industry (McGrath
1995; Zahra and George 1999), and even
different countries (Thornhill and Amit
2001). Throughout, the overlap of phenomena is understandable; however,
scholars now recognize that managing
and developing an ICV is not the same as
running an established business, pursuing an external start-up, or even necessarily engaging in traditional product
development. This distinction is crucial to
the advancement of ICV research.
Product Development. One common
overlap with ICVs has been product
development and the plethora of studies
that exist (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995;
Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt 2001;
Gomes et al. 2001; Henard and Szymanski 2001; Ledwith 2000; Simon and
Houghton 2003; Storey and Easingwood
1996; Story, Smith, and Saker 2001).
Today, scholars acknowledge that a new
product is not necessarily the same thing
as a new corporate venture (Greene,
Brush, and Hart 1999), and that a
common problem for corporations has
been in the failure to understand the
distinctive features of new markets, businesses, products, and so on (Garvin
2002).
Product development is a broad
concept that represents both new and
existing products. A new product can
represent product repositioning, product
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Table 1
Internal Corporate Venture Criteria Review
Present
Proposal

Thornhill and
Amit (2001)

Zahra and
George
(1999)
McGrath
(1995)
Day (1994)

Miller,
Gartner,
and Wilson
(1988)
von Hippel
(1977)

1.
2.

Originated internally
Considered distinct from company’s existing products/
services
3. Intended as or became a new business
4. Pursued within past seven years
A business was considered new if it had developed any three of
the following:
1. New markets
2. New methods of distribution
3. New products/services
4. New technology
1. The firm had to be in existence for eight years or less
2. The firm had to be headquartered in the United States
3. The venture had to be active in one or more of the major
areas that constituted the biotechnology industry
1. Attempt to enter a new market
2. Sell a new product/service
3. Employ a significantly different process, utilizing internal
resources
1. Start-up that originated internally
2. New to firm on at least two dimensions (product, market,
technology)
3. Requires significant investment of company resources
beyond expenditure year
Includes new products based on new technologies that would
displace a company’s existing product. Does not include
product extensions or brand introductions.
A business marketing a service or product that:
1. The parent company has not previously marketed
2. That required the parent company to obtain new
equipment, people, or knowledge
1. Developing a new product
2. Bringing it to market
3. Carrying it through at least it initial phases of marketplace
activity

line extension, product modifications, a
new product category for the firm, or a
previously nonexistent product to the
world (Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt
2001; Crawford 1994; Palmer and Cole
1995). Most importantly, scholars have
noted that, “this activity [new product
development] does not always require
the creation of a new organization. . . a
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new product launch/market extension
vis-à-vis an “innovation” is not the same
thing as a new corporate venture”
(Greene, Brush, and Hart 1999).
Independent Ventures. It may initially
seem logical to equate an ICV to an independent venture (or start-up) given that a
new ICV is a start-up within the context
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of the established parent firm. The ICV
can have a venture champion and the
independent venture has its entrepreneur. However, ICV champions tend to
have access to valuable resources and
support from existing parent firms. In
contrast, the independent entrepreneur
lacks the “deep pockets” of a parent
organization, but enjoys more decisionmaking freedom without the bureaucracy of a parent organization. It is not
until investors demand it that most entrepreneurs even engage in formal strategic
planning, compose written business
plans, and/or address other hurdles (Hoy
2006).
When Chrisman, Bauerschmidt, and
Hofer proposed their model for the performance of independent ventures, they
stated that “the determinants of performance of a new [independent] venture
and an established business are nearly
identical” (emphasis added) (Chrisman,
Bauerschmidt, and Hofer 1998). In their
model of independent venture performance, their referenced studies included
corporate ventures, as well as independent ventures. Similarly, in Sandberg and
Hofer’s (1987) review of other venture
performance studies, we find that many
scholars had relied upon the PIMS (Profit
Impact of Marketing Strategy) database
(that is, product development data),
venture capital projects, or independent
start-ups (see Table 2, which illustrates
this overlap in earlier work). Indeed,
many early proclaimed ICV studies combined related phenomena to increase the
sample size (but not the representativeness), which likely led to the inconsistency of findings.
External Ventures and Established
Businesses. A common misperception
is that if we understand how to manage
and grow established businesses, then
we can do the same with ICVs. However,
scholars have now revealed that some of
the skills, capabilities, policies, and
structures that are pertinent to the

success of an established business may
in fact contribute to the failure of a new
business (Block 1982; Campbell et al.
2003; Tushman and Nadler 1986). An
ICV can be completely autonomous like
an independent start-up, or it can be
integrated (like an acquisition) into the
parent firm and subjected to the same
rules and requirements of the existing
business(es). This suggests performance
implications for the venture based on the
nature or type of venture autonomy. In
the next sections, the nature of venture
autonomy for this study is discussed and
hypotheses are presented.

The Nature of Venture
Autonomy
Autonomy has historically been
treated as a one-dimensional construct
with inconclusive findings drawn from
this broad view (Rauch et al. 2009). It is
a unique characteristic of ICVs and prone
to implicit theories based on anecdotal
evidence and personal experiences. For
instance, during interviews, it is not
uncommon for respondents to express
their belief that more (or less) autonomy
is appropriate based on their experiences. In practice, autonomy can reflect
many conditions, such as tight versus
loose controls, uniform versus tailored
policies, and centralized versus decentralized processes, which early research
believed to impact the performance of
established businesses (Block 1982). As a
result, recent researchers now suggest
that autonomy may be best examined as
a multidimensional construct (Covin and
Miles 2007).
A recent study unintentionally reflects
two major types of autonomy implicit in
the extant literature when the authors
suggest that venture units need (1) sufficient separation and (2) to make their
own investment decisions (Campbell
et al. 2003). First, the authors have indicated what I call the structural type of
autonomy that addresses the physical
location and/or separation between the

JOHNSON

473

474

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

CV divisions
and IVs
IVs

Market conditions, start-up
goals, venture strategies
Entrepreneurial team, product
features, market, and
financial characteristics
Venture strategy, barriers to
entry, venture origin
Market characteristics, product
features, venture strategy,
venture organization, venture
leadership

Start-up goals, entry strategy,
market characteristics,
relatedness to parent,
competitive reaction
Start-up goals, venture
sponsors, market
characteristics, entry strategy
Industry structure, venture
strategy, entrepreneur

Independent Variables

b

CV, corporate venture.
IV, independent venture.
c
PIMS, Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy database (i.e., product development data).

a

McDougall
(1989)
Stuart and Abetti
(1987)

Sales, market share, profits,
ROI, and four cost
measures
ROI, ROS, market share,
change in market share
Initial quantified success
initial subjective success

IVs

New venture performance
(five category scale)

IVsb

ROI, market share

ROI, market share

CV divisions

Hobson and
Morrison
(1983)
Sandberg (1986)

CV divisions

ROI, ROS, cash flow,
market share, and three
others

CVa divisions

Biggadike (1976,
1979)

MacMillan and
Day (1987)
MacMillan et al.
(1987)

Dependent Variables

Type of Venture

Author(s)

Questionnaire survey

Questionnaire survey

Venture capital project
proposal questionnaires

PIMS Start-up database

Venture capital project
proposals

PIMS start-up database

PIMSc start-up
questionnaire
(by Biggadike)

Data Source

Factor analysis, cluster
analysis, F-tests
Stepwise regression
analysis

Cluster, regression, and
factor analysis

Mann–Whitney U-test and
Spearman rank
correlation
Correlation analysis

Graphic comparisons

Correlation coefficient
analysis

Data Analysis

Table 2
1987 Venture Performance Literature Overview Illustrating the Common Overlap of
Related Phenomena in Earlier Venture Studies

venture and existing business units. Similarly, others have asserted that divisions
charged with identifying, launching, and
growing promising new businesses internally should do so by “creating protected
entrepreneurial islands, with their own
distinctive modes of operation, in the
midst of the traditional organization’s
formal structures and processes” (Garvin
2002, p. 9). In other words, “sufficient
separation” and “entrepreneurial islands”
both suggest that the ventures should
be self-contained business units whose
operations are independent of the other
businesses. Second, the authors indicate
what I consider the planning type of
autonomy. Planning autonomy addresses
the basic ideas of planning and control,
such as setting goals, strategy, and evaluating progress.
In this study, I propose these two
types (or dimensions) of venture
autonomy—VSA and VPA. Together,
they reflect the physical and operational
links between the venture and the
parent, as well as the freedom of the
managers to establish the plan for the
venture. From an analogous personal
perspective, autonomy could reflect
whether your office is located at the
headquarters or at home; and whether
you had the freedom to set your own
hours and goals. In turn, your productivity might be impacted by these types and
levels of autonomy afforded you in your
work.

Venture Autonomy Hypotheses
Our own experience-based bias favors
more autonomy. Given the inconsistency
of earlier findings, in this section, we see
both the support and nonsupport found
in the literature based upon the available
sample at the time beginning with the
support for planning autonomy.
Planning Autonomy Support. A direct
association was found between innovation and the commitment of management, as well as between management

attitudes and the establishment of an
innovative environment (Karagozoglu
1988; Waters 2000). A strong correlation
was also reported between venture
performance and parental separation
(Birkinshaw, Batenburg, and Murray
2002). The idea was that managers
needed to protect the ICV by making it
independent of the parent as quickly as
possible. Based on observations from the
PIMS database, scholars suggested that
corporate management should take a
“hands-off” approach to ventures (Miller
and Camp 1985). Accordingly, research
has supported “independent” decisionmaking for new ventures, and attributed
the difference between success and
failure to management, finding greater
success when corporate management
stayed out of the way (Birkinshaw,
Batenburg, and Murray 2002; Block and
MacMillan 1993; Ginsberg and Hay 1994;
MacMillan, Block, and Subbanarasimha
1986; Sykes and Block 1989).
Similarly, some scholars have asserted
that venture-level managers need to be
able to define the rules of the game and
direct expectations for their ventures
(Ginsberg and Hay 1994). Tidd and
Taurins (1999) stated that there is often a
conflict between the parent’s goals and
the venture’s activities. Many scholars,
even those initially biased toward
venture–parent integration, have found
support for separating the developing
venture from the parent (Birkinshaw,
Batenburg, and Murray 2002). In a subsequent study using the PIMS database,
Miller, Spann, and Lerner (1991) found
that a high level of direct corporate
involvement actually reduced performance in terms of both lower product
quality and higher costs. The overall
implication is more authority for venture
management and less intrusion from corporate management. Therefore, we
hypothesize:
H1a: The degree of VPA will be positively
associated with venture performance.
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Planning Autonomy Nonsupport. The
prevailing argument has been to shield
the emerging business from the corporate bureaucracy. However, although we
believe that venture managers need to be
free (from parental distractions) to adapt
and modify venture operations as new
market information becomes available,
the overall objectives and expectations
still have to be agreed upon by the
parent organization. The venture can
also benefit tremendously from the
knowledge, experience, and guidance of
the parent in much the same way
the corporation might benefit from the
wisdom of its board of directors. The
suggestion that venture managers should
have autonomy to define the rules (Ginsberg and Hay 1994) may neglect the
experience of senior corporate-level
executives, as well as create hostility
between venture managers and the managers of existing business units. Management should provide the venture some
freedom but must also pre-empt the conflicts that can arise (Tidd and Taurins
1999). Overall, there are no solid reasons
to believe venture-level managers will be
better equipped to establish a successful
venture in the absence of corporate-level
input. It is more likely that the more
informed the guidance senior executives
provide to venture managers, the better
the venture will perform.
Finally, given that the parent’s assessment ultimately will determine the fate of
the venture, it is prudent to have more
parental input from the corporate-level
executives in the planning process. In
essence, the ICV is not linked to the
parent (after all, it is a “new” venture),
but the parent should remain highly
involved in its development. Likewise,
the ICV managers should welcome and
capitalize on the parental involvement,
especially in planning activities and decisions so that performance expectations
are agreed upon, realistic, and/or more
easily modified, if necessary, as more
details of the targeted market of the ICV
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become available. Thus, the argument is
to not give planning autonomy to the
venture but to have the planning directly
dependent upon the corporate evaluators. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1b: The degree of VPA will be negatively
associated with venture performance.
Structural
Autonomy
Support. As
noted, a popular assumption is that new
ventures need to be free from the standard bureaucratic requirements in order
to adapt to changing market demands.
Scholars believed that the many corporate policies, procedures, and structures
designed to facilitate the management of
existing businesses actually impeded the
development of new ventures (Luther
1984). Thornberry (2003) pointed out
that some companies spin out their ventures so that they will not be constrained
by established company policies and
protocols. In a study of ventures in four
large firms, Dougherty (1995) found that
new product ventures that continued to
operate within the structure and processes established for existing business
units failed. Consequently, the argument is made that ventures should be
structurally autonomous. Therefore, we
hypothesize:
H2a: The degree of VSA will be positively
associated with venture performance.
Structural Autonomy Nonsupport. In
stark contrast to the argument for structural autonomy is the consideration that
familiarity, experience, and active sponsors with intimate knowledge of the
business may drive venture success. For
instance, research has shown that separation bred conflict within many organizations (Birkinshaw, Batenburg, and
Murray 2002; Garvin 2002, 2004;
Sobkowiak 2002). Similarly, there has
been considerable research suggesting
that separation does not support venture
performance (Birkinshaw, Batenburg,
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and Murray 2002; Campbell et al. 2003;
Garvin 2002, 2004; Luther 1984). Given
the potential for increased organization
conflict and the lack of support specifically for increased venture performance,
we hypothesize:
H2b: The degree of VSA will be negatively
associated with venture performance.

Venture Stages of
Development
There are arguments both for and
against autonomy. Drawing from the
knowledge of independent ventures, we
believe that these mixed findings are due
to the various stages of development that
a venture undergoes over time. As an
independent venture develops, what it
takes to continue its development also
changes (Boeker and Karichalil 2002).
Research has supported that organizations do experience stages or phases of
development with different emphasis or
challenges at different stages (Drazin and
Kazanjian 1990; Kazanjian and Drazin
1989, 1990). Extrapolating from these,
we expect potential changes in the
autonomous needs of an ICV as it develops as well.
For instance, the degree of internal
support and other venture needs should
change as management’s understanding
of the venture and its targeted markets
increase. Recent research has analyzed
the Corporate Entrepreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI) used to evaluate
the entrepreneurial readiness of corporations (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra
2002) and presented many factors as well
as challenges regarding new venture pursuits. Some of the factors presented
included the need for internal support
(George and MacMillan 1985), knowledge and understanding of competitive markets (Zahra, Neubaum, and
El-Hagrassey 2002), and market attractiveness (Chandler and Hanks 1994).
Quite possibly, performance expectations and satisfaction would also vary

with the venture’s stage of development
as a function of market feedback. In
general, the venture will need individuals with diverse skills (Ensley, Pearson,
and Amason 2002), and marketexperienced personnel (Garvin 2002).
Consistent with Thornhill and Amit
(2001), we have three stages of venture
development: early stage (i.e., year of
first financial investment in the venture),
middle stage (i.e., year the venture
began to generate revenue), and established stage (i.e., year the venture
became profitable). Perhaps one of the
most critical stages for an independent
venture is the early stage (or start-up). It
is a stage during which an independent
venture must survive on limited start-up
capital. During this time, the entrepreneur must acquire customers and
enough revenues to support its operations before the start-up capital is
depleted. In terms of its structure, we
expect the venture to be separated from
the existing business so that it may react
quickly to market developments without
the corporate bureaucracy impeding its
growth.
In the early stage of development,
the decision to pursue the venture, the
budget for the venture, as well as the
motivation, style of management, strategies, objectives, and expectations, must
be established by the parent and
accepted by the venture manager. Many
unknowns will also begin to be
answered, and the parent needs to
monitor the emerging venture as a result.
Given the negative association between
mature ventures versus the need for
parental resources (Thornhill and Amit
2001), once the venture matures into the
middle stage, we believe more autonomy
may be appropriate. Structurally, once
the venture reaches maturity, the
parent should remove autonomy and
integrate the venture into the existing
portfolio of businesses. In summary, the
stage of development for the venture
will moderate the relationship between
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performance and autonomy. Therefore,
we hypothesize:
H3: The relationship between autonomy
and performance will be moderated
by the stage of development for the
venture.

Research Design
This research recognizes the trade-offs
of early research designs and seeks to
improve upon them where possible.
Since executives can define their business development activities in terms of
corporate venture capital, acquisitions,
alliances, product developments, extensions, new products, and so on, without
a concise definition, researchers risk
obtaining samples that are not representative of the phenomena. Indeed, as discussed in the literature review from von
Hippel in 1977; Miller, Gartner, and
Wilson in 1988; Day in 1994; McGrath
in 1995; Zahra and George in 1999;
Thornhill and Amit in 2001; to Miles and
Covin in 2002, we see the criteria used to
define the ICV varied (Cooper, Edgett,
and Kleinschmidt 2001), and that there
was considerable overlap of related phenomena (Table 2). Consequently, equivocal results emerge from the studies. In
this study, data were collected in a
manner to address this and other
research design limitations in earlier
studies.

Data Collection
Factiva was used to create a list of 78
corporations across multiple industries,
listed on the NASDAQ or NYSE, with at
least 20,000 employees, and over $1
billion in sales. The purpose was to identify companies with a history of internal
venturing and to obtain a variety of different internal venturing experiences.
There were no intentional boundary conditions (i.e., limitations placed on the
assumed applicability of our hypotheses). This is not an industry-specific
theory, but a theory for ICV performance
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across industries and businesses. Some
companies required that neither the
company nor the respondents be explicitly identified. Nevertheless, the data set
includes a fairly diverse set of industries
and businesses—automotive, oil and gas,
chemical, consumer products—and represents companies such as 3M, Whirlpool, and P&G. Geographically, the data
set includes several U.S. states: Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, Georgia,
Virginia, and Missouri, for a total of 38
ICVs. Data regarding ventures that did
not meet the strict ICV definition and
criteria were rejected, resulting in a
smaller but more representative sample.
The corporations were then contacted
and screened for a history of pursuing
new business investments given that corporations are typically consistent in their
investment types (Amit, Livnat, and
Zarowin 1989). Fourteen of the corporations either directly stated that they did
not pursue new ICVs, or it was determined that they did not, as defined in
this study. Of the 64 remaining, a total of
16 participated (25 percent response
rate), which exceeds the response rate
for some new venture studies (McDougall and Robinson 1990).
To focus clearly on ICVs, respondents
from the participating companies were
asked to identify ventures that originated
internally; were considered distinct from
the company’s existing products or services; and were intended as or became
new businesses. This built upon the criteria used in previous studies (see
Table 1) to eliminate or minimize contamination from related phenomena.
Without a clear and explicit definition,
researchers risk obtaining large samples
that are not representative of the phenomena, since executives can define
their business development activities in
terms of corporate venture capital, acquisitions, joint ventures, and strategic alliances, as well as product development
and extensions. Ventures were also
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limited to an age of no more than seven
years, which is within the range of ages
accepted for defining new ventures
(Lussier 1995; McDougall 1989; Shrader,
Oviatt, and McDougall 2000; Zahra 1996;
Zahra, Ireland, and Hitt 2000).
A final important characteristic of the
research design was that the data were
collected using a two-part survey supplemented by interviews. The independent
data were collected from the venture
managers, who had the detailed knowledge regarding the operations of the
venture, whereas the performance data
were collected from the senior executives responsible for overseeing the business development activities and better
able to report the parent’s assessment of
venture performance. Some of the
various positions and titles of respondents are shown in Figure 1. Their
respective questionnaires were completed independently, clearly separating
the collection of dependent variable data
from the independent variable data.

Figure 1
Positions and/or Titles of
Respondents

Sample Size
Without enough cases, one must
either reduce the model or use techniques to compensate for size. When too
few cases exist, results are difficult to
find and can become highly sample specific (the extreme is called a “case
study”). When too many cases exist, findings can actually be of little value as well.
In fact, it is often forgotten that a sample
size can be too large as well as too small,
leading to type 1 and type II errors (i.e.,
rejecting the truth versus accepting a lie).
In both situations, the issue is exacerbated if the sample is not representative
of the phenomenon. The sample size
needs to be large enough to detect
important differences with high probability. In other words, we need to
collect enough evidence to avoid condemning an innocent man by rejecting
the presumption of innocence (Vogt
1999). However, if a sample size
becomes too large, even unimportant dif-

President

Business development manager
Chief executive officer
Chief financial officer
Director
Director of new product integration
Executive vice president
Front-line leader
General manager
Group vice president
Innovation consultant
Marketing consultant

Product/project manager
Senior vice president of business development
Vice president
Vice president of business development
Vice president of marketing
Vice president of innovation

ferences (the untruths) can become statistically significant with high probability
(this reflects the saying, if we hear a lie
often enough, we might begin to think it
true). The general assumption is that we
need a ratio of 20 to 1 in terms of sample
size to variables examined. Although this
number is desirable, it is actually much
higher than necessary for statistical
analysis as noted by statisticians.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

1
2
3
4
5

Variable

Mean

S.D.a

Internal Corporate
Venture
Performance
Firm Size (log)
Venture Age
Venture Structural
Autonomy
Venture Planning
Autonomy

4.378

1.64

4.807
4.546
3.575

0.31
2.94
1.91

3.985

1.43

1

2

3

-0.114
0.011
-0.131

1
0.432**
0.143

1
0.291*

-0.398**

0.026

4

5

-0.025

1

1

-0.076

1

a

S.D., standard deviation.
*Significant at 0.10 level (two-tailed).
**Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed).
The general rule is that the ratio
should never fall below 5 to 1,
meaning that there should be five
observations for each independent
variable in the variate. As this ratio
falls below 5 to 1, the researcher
encounters the risk of “overfitting”
the variate to the sample, making
the results too specific to the
sample and thus lacking generalizability (Hair et al. 1998, p. 166).

In his discussion of regression
models, Long (1997, p. 54) also states, in
“the literature on the covariance structure model, the rule of at least five observations per parameter is often given.”
Unfortunately, it seems that we will often
sacrifice the quality of our sample in
order to achieve a greater quantity of
sample. Similarly, we ignore observable
patterns in search of p-value confirmations. In this study, efforts have been
made to improve upon both of these
issues.

Variables
Face and content validity were
checked by a group of researchers and
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executives. Confirmatory factor analysis
was also conducted and showed proper
loadings, with all loadings below the
0.600 threshold suppressed. The varimax
rotation method was used, as is standard,
with the rotation converging in 10 iterations. Overall, the research variables displayed good psychometric properties,
which included strong Cronbach alphas
of 0.78, 0.89, and 0.94 for VSA, VPA, and
ICV performance, respectively. Table 3
provides the descriptive statistics and
correlations.
Internal Corporate Venture (ICV) Performance. ICV performance was derived
from a measure by Thornhill and Amit
(2001), and measured based on agreement with the following statements rated
on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree):
(1) This venture generally meets (or
met) the expectations of the parent
corporation.
(2) The parent corporation views (or
viewed) this venture as being successful overall.

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

(3) The parent corporation believes (or
believed) that this venture achieved
all of its milestones (i.e., events
crucial to the venture’s successful
development) on schedule for each
stage of its development.
(4) This venture is performing (or performed) well in terms of the criteria
(e.g., market share, returns, satisfaction, learning, or positioning) that
the parent corporation considers (or
considered) most important to the
venture’s success.
Venture Structural Autonomy. VSA
represented the extent to which the venture’s operations were linked to those of
other businesses of the corporation and
was measured based on agreement with
the following statements rated on a
seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree):
(1) The venture operates as a selfcontained business unit, with few
or weak structural or process linkages with other businesses of the
corporation.
(2) The venture’s operations are not
significantly constrained or dictated
by formal structural or process linkages with other businesses of the
corporation.
(3) The venture operates in an independent manner vis-à-vis other businesses of the corporation.
Venture Planning Autonomy. VPA represented the extent to which the venture’s management team was responsible
for establishing goals, timetables, and
strategy for the venture. The question
stem for VPA was: “Who is responsible
for each of the following planning
and/or control related activities?” Planning autonomy for the venture was then
measured based on the response to the
five items below using a scale ranging
from 1 to 7, where 1 = the sole responsibility of a higher level(s) (e.g., CEO and

Corporate) of authority within the corporation; 4 = equal responsibility of
venture-level and a higher level(s) of
authority within the corporation; and,
7 = the sole responsibility of venturelevel management:
(1) Setting the venture’s goals.
(2) Establishment of a timetable (if
applicable) for the achievement of
the venture’s goals.
(3) Choice of formal criteria used to
measure the venture’s performance.
(4) Formation or formulation of the
venture’s business strategy.
(5) Decision to change (if necessary)
the venture’s business strategy.
Controls. Three stages of venture development were used (Thornhill and Amit
2001): Early stage (defined as the year of
first financial investment in the venture),
middle stage (defined as the year the
venture began to generate revenue), and
established stage (defined as the year the
venture became profitable). Whereas
some ventures remain at a particular
stage for an extended period, other ventures become established rather quickly.
Therefore, controls were provided for
the potential effects of venture age,
defined as the length of time the venture
has been established, the time since termination, or the time since first financial
investment, accordingly. Parent size was
measured by using the number of
employees, as has been done in recent
studies to avoid potential complications
with revenues (Lee, Lee, and Pennings
2001; McGrath 2001).
As a test of robustness, a new hybrid
control variable was created using a technique that increases the power of small
samples. The new hybrid control was
created based on the original controls
(e.g., firm size, venture age, and venture
stage), which were then regressed on
each independent variable, and the standardized coefficients used to compute
the hybrid control. Thus, if testing five
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Figure 2
Graphical Analysis of Overall Relationship between
Venture Planning Autonomy and Performance
7.00

6.00

Established stage
Early stage

ICV performance

5.00
Overall

4.00

3.00

R2 quadratic = 0.254

Middle stage

R2 quadratic = 0.646
R2 quadratic = 0.887

2.00

R2 quadratic = 0.239

1.00
1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

Venture structural autonomy

variables, then new controls would have
to be computed (one for each variable).
The hybrid control for variable number
one would be: IV1 = b1 ¥ CV1 + b2 ¥
CV2 + b3 ¥ CV3 + . . . bn ¥ CVn containing
all the respective variance, which then
allows one hybrid control to be entered
in place of five original controls. A new
regression is then run using the hybrid
control variable.

Analysis and Results
Autonomy and Performance
Despite having a sufficient sample
size (see Research Design), to corroborate any effects that might be questioned,
the new hybrid control variable was
created (see Variables: Controls). Various
analyses were then rerun using the
hybrid control variable. This approach
can reduce R2 values and result in fewer
fitting models, but, in return, provides a
robustness check.
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The analyses began with a graphical
examination of the hypothesized relationships between autonomy and performance. Graphical analysis is among the
oldest and most versatile of analytical
techniques, and has long been used
and accepted in a variety of research
(Bernstein and Cowden 1937; Chan,
Makino, and Isobe 2006; Ruamsook,
Russell, and Thomchick 2007). The
Journal of Computational and Graphical
Statistics published by the American Statistical Association (an established
authority in statistical techniques) is
devoted to extending the use of this
often-misunderstood technique in statistics. The initial graphical analyses displayed a negative relationship between
VPA and ICV performance (Figure 2) in
support of H1b, but a curvilinear (or
inverted-U) relationship between VSA
and ICV performance in support of H3
(Figure 3).
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ICV performance

Figure 3
Graphical Analysis of Curvilinear Relationship between
Venture Structural Autonomy and Performance and Stage of
Development (Early, Middle, and Established) Trend Effects

Using the regression curve estimation
analysis of IBM SPSS Statistics package
19, VSA, as displayed in Figure 3, has a R2
quadratic of 0.239, VSA beta coefficient of
1.998 (significance = 0.015), and a VSAsquared beta coefficient of -2.166 (significance = 0.009), indicating the strong
curvilinear relationship. In comparison,
VPA, as displayed in Figure 2, does not
display a significant curvilinear relationship (VPA beta significance = 0.516, and
VPA-squared beta significance = 0.907).
However, for VPA, we do see a significant
linear relationship (R2 linear = 0.210, VPA
beta coefficient = -0.459, significance =
0.015). For further analysis, the VSA
variable was squared within a standard
regression model, showing that the
second order effects indeed reached
significance (beta = -2.294, p < .05). This
relationship was also tested using the

hybrid control and held (beta = -2.122,
p < .05) (Table 4: models 1 and 2). Thus,
the results of graphical analytical techniques are consistent with standard
methods, with the added benefit of
instant visual information, confirmation,
and interpretation.
Main Effects and Interactions. Using
linear regression in SPSS, controls were
first entered, followed by VSA and VPA,
and multiplicative interaction variables.
Given the findings from the graphical
analysis, the task was to examine each
venture stage independently. Therefore,
venture stage was used as a selection
variable, which is a direct method to
analyze stages that can provide a more
fine-grained analysis similar to some
more common approaches, such as moderated regression.
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0.046

Beta

-0.740

0.004
-0.083
0.046

3.771
(5.205)
0.213
(1.142)
-0.034
(0.113)

B

Control

-0.598
(5.155)
0.800
(1.078)
-0.067
(0.110)
1.464
(0.639)
-0.206 (0.084)
0.232
0.085
3.113*

B

Model 1

-0.191 (0.081)
0.209
0.102
2.892*

-0.011 (0.267)

3.099 (0.921)

B

-2.294**

-0.038a

Beta

Model 2

1.338 (0.615)
0.001
-0.040
0.035

-0.049a (0.265)

4.673 (0.385)

B

Hybrid Control

Hybrid Model (Robustness Check)

2.160**

-0.144

0.172

Beta

Standard Model Across Venture Stages

Standard error in parenthesis.
a
Hybrid control.
b
VSA, venture structural autonomy.
*Significant at .10 level.
**Significant at .05 level.

VSA^2
R2
Adjusted R2
F-Statistic

VSAb

Venture Age

Firm Size

Constant

Variable

-2.122**

1.975**

-0.009

Beta

Table 4
Standard Curvilinear Test and Hybrid Robustness Check for Performance and Venture
Structure Autonomy Relationship Regression Results

The first regression analysis was conducted across all venture development
stages as with earlier research. Consistent
with the graphical analytical technique,
VPA was negative and significant providing strong support for H1b (beta =
-0.606, p < .01) (Table 5, model 3). VSA,
venture age, and firm size were not
significant. There was no interaction
effect.
Next examined were ventures that had
progressed beyond the early stage. The
nature of expectations might be less stringent during the early development stage
versus later stages, thereby influencing
performance perceptions. VPA remained
negative and displayed a slightly greater
effect size in later venture development
stages (beta = -0.685, p < .01) (Table 5,
model 4). VSA and size remained not
significant, whereas venture age reached
significance (p < .10).
Given the consistency of the VPA
results, the effect of VSA was partialed
out, and another look taken of VPA across
development stages. VPA remained significant (beta = -0.615, p < .01). Additionally, during later stages the effect size of
VPA (beta = -0.685, p < .01) and age both
increased. With the hybrid control, the
previous results continued to hold (VPA:
beta = -0.549, p < .01; VSA: not significant). The significant model accounted
for 20.6 percent of the variance (Table 5,
model 5), adding to the strong support for
VPA, H1b. Likewise, the lack of a direct
effect from VSA provides support for the
basic premise that there are different
types of autonomy, and that the nature of
the relationship between autonomy and
ICV performance is a function of the type
of autonomy.
In summary, H1b (VPA is negatively
associated with venture performance)
was supported, and H3 (the stage of
development of a venture moderates the
relationship between performance and
autonomy) was supported. H2 regarding
VSA was not supported. However, it was
discovered that there is a relationship

between VSA and ICV performance to
consider within specific venture development stages. For instance, a positive
association between VSA and venture
performance (similar to H2a) occurs with
ventures in the middle stage of development, whereas a negative association
with venture performance (similar to
H2b) occurs with ventures when they
reach the established stage. The early
stage displays an inverted-U relationship.

Discussion
Every year, numerous companies, like
Kraft, Disney, 3M, as well as smaller,
lesser known companies, seek to develop
new businesses known as ICVs within
their established businesses. Among the
myriad of decisions that have to be made
for the successful development of the ICV
is the decision regarding autonomy.
Among many scholars, it is believed that
the lack of autonomy for the venture leads
to venture failure (Birkinshaw, Batenburg, and Murray 2002; Block and MacMillan 1993; Ginsberg and Hay 1994;
MacMillan, Block, and Subbanarasimha
1986; Miller and Camp 1985; Sykes and
Block 1989). Indeed, many of these early
studies represent groundbreaking work
that has been instrumental in our initial
understanding of corporate venturing.
Yet early empirical studies reflect equivocal results, and ICV performance continues to be random at best.
This study seeks to advance the
research by empirically examining some
popular assumptions using a more representative sample of the phenomenon.
This paper focuses on different types or
dimensions of autonomy that historically
has been assumed to be a broad onedimensional construct that positively
impacts ICV performance. However, two
types of autonomy are distilled from the
extant literature. Measures were subsequently developed, tested, and found to
properly load on the two proposed types
(or dimensions) of autonomy: VPA
and VSA. These two types of venture
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-0.241

0.066

Beta

0.044
-0.057
0.436

4.029
(5.211)
0.275
(1.155)
-0.097
(0.111)

B

Control
Beta

6.223
(4.262)
0.504
0.121
(.943)
-0.115
-0.286
(0.101)
-0.206
-0.318
(0.128)
-0.575
-0.606***
(0.175)
0.470
0.345
3.771**

B

Model 3

Across All
Venture Stages

Standard error in parenthesis.
a
Hybrid control variable created.
b
VSA, venture structural autonomy.
c
VPA, venture planning autonomy.
*Significant at 0.10 level.
**Significant at 0.05 level.
***Significant at 0.01 level.

R2
Adjusted R2
F-Statistic

VPAc

VSAb

Venture age

Firm size

Constant

Variable

-0.286

0.203

Beta

0.063
-0.054
0.537

0.959
(6.222)
0.973
(1.357)
-0.106
(0.105)

B

Control
Beta

4.251
(5.413)
0.883
0.184
(1.140)
-0.189
-0.508*
(0.103)
-0.015
-0.023
(0.146)
-0.565
-0.685***
(0.171)
0.474
0.323
3.152**

B

Model 4

After Early
Venture Stage

0.023a

Beta

0.001
-0.049
0.011

(0.943)

4.855
(0.283)
0.098a

B

Control

0.167a

Beta

-0.521
-0.549***
(0.191)
0.282
0.206
3.722**

(0.850)

7.076
(0.851)
0.706a

B

Model 5

Performance and
Venture Planning Autonomy
with Hybrid Control Test

Table 5
Performance and Venture Autonomy (Structural and Planning): Linear Regression Results

autonomy and the impact of venture
stages are then analyzed in terms of their
relationship with ICV performance given
a sample of ICVs without related
phenomena. The results are a new
understanding of the autonomy–ICV
performance relationship.

VPA Findings
The differences between what the
parent wants and what the venture can
deliver creates conflicts that are believed
to adversely impact performance leading to conclusions for a “hands off”
approach or, in other words, more VPA.
Thus, popular belief is that an ICV is like
an independent start-up and succeeds
when separated from the parent organization and the venture managers are able
to exercise independent decision-making
(Birkinshaw, Batenburg, and Murray
2002; MacMillan, Block, and Subbanarasimha 1986; Sykes and Block 1989).
However, contrary to the popular
belief to provide more VPA, this study
finds that VPA is negatively associated
with ICV performance. Rather than allowing venture managers to define the rules
(Ginsberg and Hay 1994), this study finds
that venture managers should embrace
the venture–parent relationship and capitalize on the needs and benefits of that
relationship. Ultimately, the venture
exists for the parent organization, and
thus we need to align the goals the parent
has for the venture with the actual capabilities of the venture, resulting in more
realistic expectations. Proper and clear
goal alignment will also reduce conflicts.
This alignment is critical given that ICVs
are really inventions of established businesses (i.e., a parent organization), and
what the parent wants is what it must
deliver. These internal ventures might
better be called “inventures” since, like
“inventions,” if they do not show promise,
they might be scrapped or placed upon a
shelf and virtually forgotten.
In summary, although both arguments
for and against VPA are plausible, our

analysis of a more representative sample
indicates that less VPA is associated with
the more successful ventures. The effect
is strong, significant, and explains from
20 to 34 percent of the performance variance (Table 5). Therefore, when it comes
to the strategies, operations, and planning, the data show that the more
involved the parent the better the performance of the ICV in terms (such as
market share, returns, satisfaction, learning, or positioning), which are important
to the parent. Of course, we ask why
these findings are contrary to popular
belief. The anecdotal evidence of the
belief of more autonomy neglects the
type of autonomy, as well as the venture’s stage of development.

VSA Findings
The second form of venture
autonomy—VSA—considers the links
between the venture and existing parental business units. For a new ICV in the
purest sense, there would be no linkages,
and the venture would be virtually independent. As revealed through the separate interviews, this is an extremely rare
situation, since in the pursuit of a new
business there always tends to be some
connection with an existing business.
Nevertheless, contrary to expectations,
there was no significant linear relationship between VSA and ICV performance,
thereby pouring even more doubt on the
popular belief for more autonomy.
Venture Stage Moderator. VPA is not
impacted by the venture’s stage of development, but VSA depends upon it.
Although the stages of development for
an ICV are distinct, research supports the
importance of stages of development or
life cycles for organizations (Drazin and
Kazanjian 1990; Kazanjian and Drazin
1989, 1990). Similarly, we find that the
nature of the relationship between VSA
and ICV performance changes as the
venture develops. A positive association
(similar to H2A) occurs with ventures in
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the middle stage of their development,
whereas a negative association occurs
(similar to H2B) with ventures that have
reached the established stage. Interestingly, during the early stage—perhaps
the most critical for a start-up as well—
the relationship displays a more complex
inverted-U shape. This reflects the delicate balance between the venture and
parent in the initial positioning of the
venture, and, although unexpected, it is
intuitively appealing given that VSA represents the operational linkages for a
dynamic ICV. The changing nature of the
relationship between VSA and performance may also account for some of the
popular beliefs and inconsistent results
when autonomy is treated as a broad
construct.
For instance, when a new venture is
initially pursued, we are aware of the
conflicts that can arise between venture
and other business units (Tidd and
Taurins 1999), which may lead us to seek
to separate them, but research has also
shown that separation can breed conflict
(Birkinshaw, Batenburg, and Murray
2002; Garvin 2002, 2004; Sobkowiak
2002). This tension may be in part due to
the venture needing to be both different
and familiar at the same time, and
needing to be both free of the policies
imposed upon existing units (Thornberry
2003) while still conforming to the established protocols for all units by virtual of
being a part of the parent organization.
Thus, without structural autonomy, the
venture is more likely to fail, and with
too much structural autonomy, the
venture is still likely to fail. Optimization
becomes the key.
During the middle stage when managers are perhaps excited about the
new venture’s growth, the venture’s
performance benefits from autonomy.
However, as we can see in the graph, the
benefit of additional VSA begins leveling
off and completely reverses upon the
venture reaching the established stage
(see Figure 3). Some of the findings of
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this study are supported by a recent case
study that suggested that ventures
should be managed in stages with stagespecific reviews, and that new markets
require learning by the organization and
changes in direction (McGrath, Keil, and
Tukiainen 2006). Without an understanding of this dynamic, a venture might
simply by chance quickly complete the
early stage (recall venture age reached
significance after the early venture development stage, indicating a potential
benefit to younger ventures later) and
benefit from the increasing level of
autonomy being provided to it because
managers were observing performance
improvements unaware of the changing
relationship. Unfortunately, the ICV will
then encounter an unanticipated obstacle
from the high level of autonomy; and, if
not corrected, fail to become established.
It will be terminated or abandoned.

Autonomy Types and Stages
in Action
Given that the findings of this study
are contrary to popular belief, it leads to
a question of how can we reconcile these
results? The differences are likely the
result of premises of the study as
reflected in three issues: (1) having an
uncontaminated sample, (2) distinguishing the different types of autonomy, and
(3) considering the stage of the venture.
Similarly, “Is there evidence in practice
of what these findings show?” Of course,
evidence opposing popular belief is
often not apparent—otherwise it would
probably not be “popular.” Nevertheless,
the need for VPA to reside at the
corporate-level (i.e., low VPA), and the
dependence of VSA (e.g., operational
protocols) on the venture stage is
reflected in some recent history and
events.
For example, given its domination of
the animation industry, the Walt Disney
Company became complacent in its
success. Unfortunately, rather than continue to internally innovate into new
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characters, Disney invested resources
into retaining the Mickey Mouse character copyright. Disney won the copyright
extension (known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act), but lost its competitive advantage in creativity and
animation. This led Disney to partner
with a largely unknown, but upcoming
company known as Pixar, and, eventually Disney even acquired Pixar Studios
once the alliance contract ended.
Despite the Pixar acquisition, without
any other strategy, Disney’s downward
spiral would definitely continue if the
Pixar competencies were lost in the
acquisition. However, rather than engage
in the typical postacquisition integration,
Disney CEO Bob Iger prudently kept
Pixar intact and gave control of Disney’s
animation operations to the former Pixar
executives, Catmull and Lasseter. A
co-director at Disney, Mr. Musker, stated,
“It’s unusual for Hollywood, making the
key creative people sort of in charge of
the actual decisions and less the studio
executives, to some degree” (emphasis
added) (Sanders 2008, B1). Mr. Musker is
alluding to VPA, and, per his statement,
it was not the norm.
In addition to VPA not being the norm
at Disney, it still is not. Disney executives
set Pixar within its portfolio and promoted the Pixar executives into Disney
executives, and gave them control over
Disney’s animation operations. Thus,
contrary to the impression that the
venture managers were now in charge of
decisions, Disney executives were overseeing the many animation ideas being
pursued (in other words, the ICVs!).
Recall that the corporate-level managers
are those responsible for overseeing the
many business development activities.
The equivalent of venture-level manager
is the writer and/or director. Mr. Lasseter, the new “executive” in charge of
Disney’s animation operations, replaced
the writer and director of an original
script (an ICV equivalent) with two new
directors (venture-level managers) based

on creative differences (Sanders 2008,
B1). These actions by Disney reflect an
understanding of the nature of venture
autonomy and performance consistent
with this study and contrary to popular
assumptions.

Limitations
Steps taken to improve upon the
trade-offs of previous studies have an
unfortunate trade-off as well—they
reduce the sample size. Additionally,
many corporations tend to be reluctant
to disclose their ICV data partly due to
the competitive nature of the information; partly due to inconsistencies
regarding what constitutes an ICV, and
partly due to their abysmal success rates
(executives tend to disassociate themselves with failures). There are also no
publicly available ICV databases containing the needed information for
research purposes. The overall effect of
these conditions is a smaller sample
than desired. Although the sample size
is still sufficient (Hair et al. 1998; Long
1997; Vogt 1999) and the sample itself
improves upon previous studies, the
size presents a serious threat to the
research by reducing the power of
the study to find significance. However,
despite the sample size, significant findings were made. Of course, significant
findings based on a small sample size
are very compelling and support the
need for further research utilizing larger
samples.
There are also biases and conflicts of
interest to consider. VPA measures the
extent to which the venture’s management team was responsible for establishing the goals, timetables, and strategy for
the venture. Among some of the items are
setting the goals and performance measurement for the venture. However, a
venture manager may not consider the
performance of a venture independent of
his own performance. Therefore, it is
possible that when venture managers
evaluate ICV performance that their self-
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assessment could be more biased,
whereas the upper-level executives might
not be as impressed with the achievements of the venture and reflect no personal bias or connection in their
assessment. This negative correlation
could potentially be an artifact of low
VPA. Based on the data, we believe it
points out the importance of the higherlevel management involvement in the
criteria for the performance evaluation.
We also believe this is an important
consideration since the evaluation of the
venture at each stage of development and
whether it continues to receive support is
ultimately determined by the upper-level
executives. During this study, performance information was collected from
both the executive in charge as well as the
venture manager. However, the executive
in charge was used in the analyses for
previously stated reasons.
Finally, there is the issue of survival.
Indeed, as discovered in the supplemental interviews, an ICV can become
orphaned. Other ICVs are metaphorically kept on life support because no
one wants to “pull the plug.” Thus,
despite the best efforts, there are
notable limitations to every study.
Although steps were taken to move in
the direction of causality, the associations discovered in this study are not
intended to describe causal relationships
but to identify potentially key variables
associated with the phenomenon. Lastly,
this is not intended to be an exhaustive
list of limitations but to remind the
reader that all research has trade-offs
that we should consider with any conclusions or subsequent recommendations to management.

Implications for Management
Executives responsible for maintaining and growing existing businesses
often look for a “balance between stability and innovation” (Klavans, Shanley,
and Evan 1985, p. 26). Of the growth
avenues available (Garvin 2002, 2004),

490

the development of a new business is
perhaps among the most rewarding and
challenging. Popular belief is that if you
can run an established business, then
you can start a new business. However,
we know that the skills needed are not
always the same. Additionally, implicit
beliefs appear to collide with business
realities. Prior studies suggest that managers should cocoon new ventures, or
treat them as isolated islands, or take
other steps to shield and protect
the fledgling venture (Garvin 2002;
Ginsberg and Hay 1994). However, new
data suggest that the prevailing suggestion to give greater autonomy to venture
managers would not only undermine
the venture–parent relationship, but
adversely impact ICV performance.
Findings from this study show a strong
negative association between VPA and
performance. The findings reveal to
managers that the goals, timetables,
strategy, performance measures, and
overall planning for the venture should
be diligently controlled by the parent so
as to not undermine future development
nor create conflict (i.e., sibling rivalry).
Furthermore, the degree of operational
links and protocol constraints should
take into account the actual developmental stage of the venture to determine
the appropriate role of autonomy. Of
course, high corporate-level involvement with the venture does not necessarily mean that the venture should be
subjected to the same policies and protocol for other business units. High
corporate-level involvement simply recognizes that the ICV needs the thoughtful tutelage of the parent though an
active planning role. The actual structure of the venture, however, is a separate issue driven by the stage of
development of the venture.
In the early stages of venture development, managers search for the balance
between control and freedom. Data
suggest that managers should put more
focus initially on understanding the
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business distinctions and communicating
why the venture is of strategic interest.
This must be accomplished without
neglecting to acknowledge its link to the
existing businesses or markets. This link
provides familiarity and comfort regarding the venture as it develops, and, as the
venture moves into the middle stage of
development, managers need to maximize structural autonomy, which will
have to be reversed as the venture
becomes established.
In summary, success depends upon
understanding the types of autonomy and
the dynamic nature of the autonomy–
performance relationship. Autonomy
should be actively monitored and tuned.
VPA should be minimized and controlled
by corporate executives regardless of
venture stage. However, the development
stage of the venture must be taken into
account when determining the appropriate VSA. In the early stage, a careful
balance of freedom and control must be
achieved. During the middle stage, management should shift focus to the distinctive value of the ICV and allow it to
operate more independently. In the final
stage, the venture should become a recognized addition to the existing group of
businesses operating under the established protocols. Lastly, as the developmental time becomes prolonged and a
venture becomes older, many ventures
experience diminishing performance,
and, if not shut down, can become
orphaned. Therefore, corporate- and
venture-level managers need to be proactive to keep the venture moving forward
and prohibit lingering.

Future Research
Given the findings of this study, the
acquisition of larger samples could
provide a deeper examination of the discovered effects of autonomy and venture
stage, and provide greater generalizability. Keeping in mind the importance of a
representative sample, researchers might
examine the popular belief that similari-

ties between a venture and parent, specifically in terms of their products and
technologies, supports ICV performance;
or, from a resource-based perspective,
researchers might examine whether the
type of resources also impact ICV performance when we take into consideration the role of autonomy in those
relationships.
This study found two dimensions to
venture autonomy, but we can consider
not only their impact on ICV pursuits, but
other business development activities.
For scholars, the development and discovery of two new measures of autonomy
that are significant in ICV performance
opens up new research possibilities into
our understanding of internal ventures
and other organizations. Furthermore, a
case study focused on the experiences of
a single company could provide insights
into the relationship between autonomy
in terms of implementation strategies or
specific types of ICVs.
Future research should examine the
need for organizations to differentiate
structures in the parent–venture relationship. A particularly interesting study
would take the curvilinear nature of VSA
and examine how organizations adapt
structures that best conform to performance expectations. Indeed, given that
during the initial stage of development
the venture is adversely impacted by
both too much and too little structural
autonomy, we want to understand the
optimal level of VSA and the driving
factors. Similarly, future research should
examine when an ICV is more likely to
be abandoned versus terminated. Understanding the drivers of these outcomes
could contribute to our understanding of
how to avoid them. Lastly, we might
examine the knowledge transfer that
takes place within organizations engaged
in corporate entrepreneurship activities
with a specific focus on ICVs.
Finally, autonomy is not the only variable that has been assumed to influence
performance
outcomes.
Additional
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studies are needed to find and examine
other factors. Ultimately, being able to
address the question of a successful ICV
design strategy for companies is where I
envision this line of research taking us.

Conclusions
In my effort to address several research
design problems found in earlier studies
and to highlight differences between
them, and by implication, the contribution of this work, the tendency is to
become overly critical. However, the contribution of prior scholars, which in fact
inspired this study, is fully recognized and
acknowledged. Any discoveries herein
are in part a continuation of those early
efforts, and, hopefully, in some small
part, help advance our understanding of
corporate venturing.
Representative samples are always
sought, but determining what is representative and obtaining such a sample is
both challenging and imperative. Therefore, when related phenomena have
been used and the resulting findings continuously reflect equivocal results, then
we need to reexamine our research
designs. Consequently, the sample criteria was derived from a review of the
literature and designed to eliminate contamination from related phenomena.
Quantity was desired, but quality was
preferred; therefore, data were discarded
if determined to be of a related phenomenon. This step was taken with the
expectation that if the sample is representative of the truth, then the overall
relationship is more likely to be revealed
in the analysis.
By also discerning some of the nuances
of the phenomenon in the extant literature, two forms of autonomy were theorized: planning and structural. By developing and examining these two types of
venture autonomy, it was (1) shown that
there are indeed different types, (2)
shown that the type of venture autonomy
is independently important to performance; and (3) discovered that the nature
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of some autonomy–performance relationships is influenced by the venture’s stage
of development. Further improvements
were achieved by collecting the independent variables from the venture managers
and the dependent variable separately
from senior executives.
Consequently, the findings of this
research are important to companies
seeking innovative growth and development. The basic research question examined is: Do ICVs designed with more
autonomy perform better than those
designed with less autonomy? I believe
we can now offer a preliminary answer
to this question based on the type of
autonomy and the venture’s stage of
development. From the empirical analysis of this primary data, we see that
despite the desire for greater autonomy
to establish the goals, timetables, or strategy by those who directly manage ICVs,
an ICV is better served with less
autonomy. In contrast, the complexity of
structural autonomy requires management to be cognizant of the development
stage of the venture when determining
the appropriate level of autonomy. There
is an inverted-U relationship in the early
stage; a positive relationship in the
middle stage; and a negative relationship
at the established stage. This has never
before been empirically known, shown,
or expected. Overall, the ICV has proven
to be an intriguing phenomenon within
corporate entrepreneurship, and, given
its value to organizational growth and
innovation, it remains a viable and
important area for research.
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